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This brief presents an overview of global 
macroeconomic developments over time and some  
of their implications for poverty trends in developing 
countries. It concludes with comments on possible 
macroeconomic policies to create an environment  
for sustainable poverty reduction in developing 
countries. 
Growth, Prices, Capital Flows, and Their 
Impact on Poverty  
Growth 
High and stable growth is important for poverty 
alleviation. Although world economic growth declined 
in every decade from the 1960s through the 1990s, it 
has picked up somewhat in the 2000s. In particular, 
world gross domestic product (GDP) per capita grew 
during 2000–05, mainly because population growth 
has declined and the performance of per capita GDP 
in developing countries has strengthened, reaching 
its highest point in the past half century. 
Growth stability is also central for improving 
poverty trends. Overall, the global economy has 
gone through four cycles of strong deceleration: 
1974–75, 1980–83, 1991–93, and 2001–02. In each 
of these episodes, the number of developing 
countries in recession increased significantly; in some 
cases more than 50 percent of the countries were 
affected—55 percent in 1982 and 53 percent in 
1992. Looking at the averages for each decade, 
volatility and the number of countries in recession 
increased during the 1980s and declined in the 
following decades, reaching their lowest values in the 
2000s (Table 1). In general, the numbers indicate 
that, in the current decade, developing countries 
have enjoyed relatively high growth with low 
volatility, which should help with poverty alleviation 
efforts. It is uncertain how much longer the current 
benign conditions can be sustained. 
Inflation and Interest Rates 
Interest rates and inflation have important 
implications for growth and poverty alleviation. For 
instance, episodes of hyperinflation, such as occurred 
in several countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC) in the 1980s and 1990s, were 
accompanied by sharp increases in poverty. But 
lower inflation tends to alleviate poverty because the 
poor have nominal incomes that adjust slowly to 
change, and they do not have access to financial 
instruments that protect them from price increases. 
In recent decades, the world economy has gone 
through cycles of rising and falling inflation, with 
parallel cycles of nominal and real interest rates. 
Recent low trends should have contributed to 
alleviating poverty. Since mid-2003, however, 
nominal and real short-term interest rates have 
begun to increase, signaling a tightening of monetary 
policy that may preface a slowdown in global GDP in 
2008–09 that could negatively affect poverty levels.  
Table 1—World Macroeconomic Indicators 
Indicator 1960s  1970s  1980s 1990s 2000s
World         
GDP Growth (% per year)   5.4  4  3  2.7  3 
GDP per Capita Growth  
(%  per  year)  3.4 2.1 1.3 1.2 1.7 
Trade Growth (% per year)  7.6  6.4  4.7  6.2  6.7 
Trade as a Share of GDP (%)  24.5  32.2  37.6  41.3  48.6 
Developing  Countries         
Total  Growth  (%  per  year)  4.9 5.3 3.4 3.4 5.2 
Per Capita Growth  
(%  per  year)  2.7 3.1 1.4 1.8 3.9 
Share in Recession (%)  28.5  29  40.6  35.8  18.9 
Capital Inflows (% GDP)  n.a.  1.25  1.06  1.44  1.11 
    Consumption Volatility  0.91  0.78  1.03  0.80  0.64 
Inflation (% per year)
a       
Industrialized  Countries    4.9 8.7 6.2 2.8 2 
Developing  Countries  4.9 16.2 36.7 36.1  5.8 
Interest  Rates  (%)       
Nominal
b  6  8.4  10.6 5.5 3.2 
Real
c  1  –0.3 4.1 2.7 1.1 
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators (Washington, 
DC, various years); International Monetary Fund, IFS (Washington, 
DC, various years). 
Notes: Growth is aggregated at market exchange rates. 
Consumption volatility data represent a median of five-year rolling 
average of standard deviation/average growth for developing 
countries. For the 1960s, data cover various years. For the 2000s, 
data on GDP, trade growth, interest rates, and inflation are for 
2000–05. 
aConsumption index. 
bLIBOR dollar deposits six months. 
cUsing industrialized-country inflation rates. 
Commodity Prices 
Many of the poorest developing countries and 
several of the middle-income ones depend on 
exports of a relatively small number of commodities. 
Therefore, price developments in these products 
tend to have a large impact on production, incomes, 
employment, fiscal accounts, and poverty in those  
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Table 2—Commodity Real Price Indexes (2000 = 100) 
Commodity 1960s  1970s 1980s 1990s 2000–05  2005–07
Food  206.9 220.0 143.9 106.1 102.2 104.7 
Agricultural  Raw  Materials   111.1  110.9 85.1 94.4 94.0 91.6 
Beverages  292.2 297.9 190.8 113.0  95.3 105.8 
Oil  23.6  60.8 103.8  57.3 106.3 158.8 
Metals  138.6 134.6 113.5  91.5 103.6 186.4 
Sources: See Table 1. 
Note: Values are deflated by the export unit value of industrialized countries. 
 
countries. World commodity prices have experienced 
important changes in real terms over these decades 
(Table 2).  
During the 1960s and 1970s prices of agricultural 
products (particularly food and beverages) were high 
in real terms. Oil prices jumped significantly during 
the mid- to late 1970s. In the early 1980s the world 
macroeconomic environment changed markedly, 
leading to a sharp decline in world growth. Nominal 
and real prices of many commodities declined, and 
during the 1990s real prices of many commodities 
were about half the levels of the 1960s and 1970s or 
less. Real prices of commodities remained on a lower 
plateau for much of the 1990s. Depressed world 
prices of food and agricultural products during the 
1980s and 1990s—in part also related to agricultural 
protectionism and subsidies in industrialized 
countries—appear to have discouraged investments 
in the rural sector of many developing countries, with 
negative consequences for the poor, who mostly 
reside there. Low food prices seem to have also 
pushed several developing countries into a more 
extreme specialization in tropical products, increasing 
their external vulnerability and transforming many of 
them into net food importers that came to depend 
on subsidized food from abroad.  
Once the world resumed growth after the 
deceleration in the early 2000s, some commodities, 
particularly metals and oil, began to climb again,  
and in 2005–07 actually surpassed the peaks 
achieved in the 1970s (in real terms). The current 
situation for agricultural commodities is different, 
however, in the sense that real prices for those 
products have stayed well below the higher levels  
of the 1960s and 1970s.  
Capital Flows and Debt 
Capital flows to developing countries have gone 
through two cycles (see Box 1). The first peaked in 
the early 1980s at more than 2 percent of the 
combined GDP for developing countries; it then 
declined during the debt crisis of the 1980s to a 
minimum of 0.6 percent of GDP in 1986. The second 
cycle began in the early 1990s; peaked in 1995 at 
about 2 percent; and dropped again during the 
sequence of developing-country crises of the late 
1990s and early 2000s, reaching a low of 0.8 percent 
of GDP in 2002. In the early 2000s, capital flows 
began to increase again. It remains to be seen how 
the latest cycle of capital flows will play out over the 
rest of this decade. 
The behavior of capital flows has several 
implications for the economy, for tradable sectors 
(like agriculture), and for the poor. Capital inflows 
usually affect growth and investment positively, but 
overvaluation of the domestic currency can hurt 
tradable sectors. Capital flows can experience 
sudden reversals, which may lead to depreciation of 
the domestic currency, banking and fiscal crises 
(when domestic private and public debt in dollars is 
widespread), and sharp declines in growth. 
Therefore, ebbs and flows of capital to developing 
countries have been associated with booms and 
busts in those countries. 
During the upswing, the impact on the poor will 
depend on their position in the economy and the 
nature of the growth process generated by those 
capital inflows. In principle, the urban poor and 
those working in nontradable sectors would benefit 
more than the rural poor during periods of growth 
associated with continued inflows of capital. 
However, if growth is sustained, benefits accrue to 
all the poor, albeit to different degrees. When 
changes in financial markets lead to sudden outflows 
of capital and growth collapses, the welfare of the 
urban poor and those working in nontradable sectors 
tends to suffer the most. 
Macroeconomic Policies for Poverty Reduction 
Growth cycles and volatility in developing countries 
since the 1960s have been greatly influenced by 
policies in industrialized countries that determine 
global macroeconomic conditions, such as interest 
rates, capital flows, and commodity prices. The main 
global macroeconomic issue today is whether an 
adjustment will be made in the U.S. current account 
(which has reached the unprecedented level of about 
2 percent of world GDP), with a corresponding 
correction in the surplus countries, and what form it 
will take. A cooperative adjustment maintaining 
world growth would require an expansion of 
domestic demand among Asian countries 
(particularly China and Japan), oil producers, and a 
variety of developing countries, along with 
appreciation of their exchange rates. The European 
Union is more advanced in the adjustment process, 
through its expanding demand and appreciation of 
the Euro. On the other side of the rebalancing 
equation, both households and the government in 
the United States would have to increase domestic 
savings (reducing domestic demand), while the real 
exchange rate also depreciates. 3 
Box 1—Growth, Capital Flows, and Poverty Trends: Global Experience from the 1960s to the 2000s
The 1960s and 1970s 
The 1960s and 1970s were years of high growth, 
moderate inflation, low (and even negative) real 
interest rates, accelerated expansion of trade, and  
high real prices of commodities. The economic 
buoyancy of those years was based on expansionary 
macroeconomic policies in many countries and stable 
exchange rates coupled with the expansion and 
liberalization of trade at the international level. LAC  
and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) were the two fastest 
growing regions during the 1960s, and they continued 
to grow strongly during the 1970s, although East Asia’s 
growth began to overtake all developing regions at  
this time. For the period since the 1960s to the early 
1980s, the World Bank, in its 1990 World Development 
Report, considered that there had been “considerable 
progress in reducing the incidence of poverty, a more 
modest reduction in the number of poor, and 
achievement of somewhat better living standards for 
those who remained in poverty” (p. 40). 
The 1980s 
In the case of many developing countries, high 
commodity prices during the 1970s allowed them to 
borrow against what was considered to be ample 
export revenues, setting the stage for the debt crises  
of the 1980s. The breakdown of the Bretton Woods 
system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates and the 
oil shocks of the second half of the 1970s drastically 
changed world macroeconomic conditions. Countries 
that had borrowed against expectations of high 
commodity prices, mainly in LAC and Africa, entered a 
period of debt distress and economic crises that 
increased poverty. Asian countries—which were 
gradually specializing in manufacturing goods, 
becoming importers of primary products and, over  
time, becoming the main recipients of capital flows—
were less affected and eventually benefited from the 
decline in prices of commodities. Poverty trends went 
hand in hand with the overall economic growth 
performance of the different developing regions. 
Poverty dropped significantly in East Asia and South 
Asia (regions that were clearly outperforming other 
developing countries in growth rates), but increased in 
LAC and SSA. 
The 1990s 
The American recession at the end of the 1980s, coupled 
with low real interest rates in industrialized countries, sent 
capital flowing back to developing countries in the  
first half of the 1990s, with Asia becoming now a more 
prominent destination. However, U.S. monetary policies 
initiated a period of tightening in the second half of the 
1990s, and capital flows to developing countries 
stopped and reversed once interest rates and the dollar 
value began to increase in the second half of the 1990s. 
A second wave of developing-country debt crises 
erupted first in Mexico in 1995, then in several countries 
of East Asia in 1997, Russia in 1998, Brazil in 1999, and 
Argentina in 2001. The sudden emergence of financial 
crises and the subsequent disruption of the economies 
of many Asian and South American countries had both 
direct and indirect effects on the poor. For the countries 
affected, the financial crises had clear negative impacts 
on poverty: the median value of the percentage of poor 
people living on less than US$1 per day increased from 
5.2 percent before the crises to 7.3 percent after them, 
and the percentage of people living on less than US$2 
per day jumped from 23 to almost 28 percent. 
The 2000s 
Global growth has been strong since the early 2000s, 
pushing up real prices of commodities such as metals  
and energy. In the 2000s, capital has been flowing from 
developing countries toward industrialized countries 
(excluding Japan), mainly to the United States, where the 
large current account deficit—and its sustainability—
remains an important concern for the performance of the 
global economy. While high commodity prices of the 
1970s prompted many developing countries to borrow 
against that collateral, in the 2000s these countries have 
been improving their fiscal and external accounts, 
reducing their debts, and increasing the availability of 
savings for the rest of the world. Also, East Asian 
countries decreased investments and turned to positive 
current accounts, adding to world excess net savings. So 
far, strong growth and lower inflation and volatility have 
translated into a decline of poverty (as a percentage of 
the population) in all developing regions. However, 
uncertainties remain due to imbalances in the world 
economy and doubts about the sustainability of growth 
patterns in the main engines of current growth, 
particularly the United States. 
The potential for a disorderly and traumatic 
adjustment is also present: a strong recession in the 
United States could accomplish the rebalancing 
through internal adjustment, as happened in the 
early 1980s and early 1990s. Or the adjustment 
could be forced by external factors if investors and 
financiers of the U.S. current account deficit were to 
significantly reduce their demand for dollar-
denominated assets. In the benign scenario, the 
demand in the rest of the world expands, and the 
dollar depreciates slowly, whereas, in the traumatic 
scenario, U.S. demand drops far more precipitously, 
and the dollar requires a further depreciation against 
those currencies now floating more freely against it 
(like the Euro). 
Either way, growth in the rest of the world will 
be negatively affected, increasing poverty in 
developing countries. In general, such downturns 
have been associated with recessions and economic 
crises in many developing countries. At the global 
level, it seems clear that there are no international 
institutions that can enforce a cooperative solution to 
the current imbalances. Discussions at the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) have focused on 
the possibility of strengthening economic policy 
surveillance that encourages cooperation. Yet the 
IMF currently does not have the instruments or the 
governance system to design and implement such an 
outcome. The same applies to other multilateral 
bodies, such as an expanded G-7 or the Financial 4 
G-20. In any case, developing countries should 
prepare for a turn in the world business cycle in the 
relatively near future, as happened with the global 
slowdowns in the early 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. 
All these macroeconomic uncertainties and 
challenges short, medium, and long term raise the 
question of what developing countries should do. At 
the macroeconomic level, it is important to try to 
smooth the business cycle and to avoid economic 
crises, if developing countries want to reduce poverty 
and hunger. To that effect, developing countries 
should (1) strengthen the fiscal positions of their 
public sectors, thus reducing public-sector debt 
ratios, using additional resources from high 
commodity prices counter-cyclically, and creating 
fiscal space to establish safety nets for the poor and 
vulnerable; (2) avoid rigid and appreciated real 
exchange rates that may lead to trade imbalances 
and excessive accumulation of external debt; and (3) 
maintain a reasonable level of reserves in the central 
banks as a precaution against possible global 
turbulences that could lead to declines in growth and 
commodity prices, possibly stopping capital flows to 
developing countries. In general, many developing 
countries seem to have been following these policies 
more closely than in the cycles that ended in debt 
crises in the 1980s and 1990s.  
It should be noted that, on the one hand, an 
economic slowdown would also reduce demand for 
energy, alleviating the currently tight markets for 
those products. On the other hand, a continuation of 
strong world growth would most likely lead to further 
increases in energy prices, which could trigger a 
future slowdown directly, or indirectly, through policy 
reactions in key countries aimed at lowering inflation. 
This will also have negative implications for poverty
in developing countries. It should be remembered 
that oil prices were about US$20 per barrel in 2001—
the beginning of the current growth cycle—but prices 
reached more than US$80 per barrel in the second 
half of 2007. As in the 1970s, the current period of 
relatively high growth, mostly fueled by middle-
income countries, may end up generating an 
additional price shock to energy products, with 
negative impacts for welfare and poverty in many 
developing countries.  
Even without accelerated growth, potential 
imbalances loom in world energy markets in the 
coming years, and, in the longer term, the 
implications of energy consumption for climate 
change may carry significant and troubling 
consequences for many developing countries. The 
complex issues linking energy use, economic 
development, poverty alleviation, and climate change 
are also affected by a significant market-coordination 
failure of global proportions, which—like the shorter 
term macro-imbalances—lacks a widely accepted 
international mechanism for resolution. Therefore, in 
the longer term, the prospects for economic 
development and poverty and hunger alleviation in 
developing countries are directly tied to the fair 
resolution of another imbalance beyond the scope of 
this brief: how to make sure that the world’s 
population has adequate access to sustainable 
energy resources.  
For Further Reading: S. Chen and M. Ravallion, “How Have  
the World’s Poorest Fared since the Early 1980s?” World Bank 
Research Working Paper 3341 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 
2004); International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook 
(Washington, DC, various issues); World Bank, Global  
Economic Prospects (Washington, DC, various issues); and  
World Bank, World Development Report 1990: Poverty 
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